









We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) the-
ory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD)
and a mini-ultimatum game (MUG). Data on behavior and ﬁrst- and
second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject’s behavior as a
material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none.
We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the ﬁrst-
movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or
both. The remaining 20% of ﬁrst-movers almost always made choices
that were “too kind” according to the theory of reciprocity. Second-
mover behavior, in both games, was fully in line with the predictions
of the theory. The average behavior and beliefs across subjects were
compatible with a sequential reciprocity equilibrium in the SPD but
not in the MUG. We also found ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs to be
unbiased in the SPD and nearly unbiased in the MUG.
JEL classiﬁcation: A13;C70;C92;D63. Keywords: sequential reci-
procity; sequential prisoner’s dilemma; mini-ultimatum game.
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Experiments have repeatedly shown that people often sacriﬁce material gains
to increase or decrease the material gains of others, even in blind one-shot
interactions. Traditional game theory has diﬃculty in explaining this. Psy-
chological game theory, pioneered by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), is better
equipped to study such behavior. It incorporates non-material considera-
tions into games by letting the utility of the agents depend on the strategy
proﬁle being played and on the beliefs agents hold about other agents’ choices
and beliefs. In a seminal paper, Rabin (1993) formalized the notion of recip-
rocal kindness in two-player normal form games along those lines. In his
“intention-based” model, agents have a tendency to respond kindly/unkindly
to the other player if she is perceived as kind/unkind. First- and second-order
beliefs come into play, because an agent’s perception of the other player’s
kindness follows from her belief about the other player’s action and from her
belief about the other player’s belief about her own action.1
Beliefs have been generally neglected by experimental economists.2 We
1Ad i ﬀerent class of models (notably the models of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000) is “outcome-based”, with utility speciﬁed as a function of the agent’s
own material payoﬀ and the distribution of payoﬀs among agents but not of intentions.
The models of Levine (1998), Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006),
and Cox et al. (2007) incorporate both distributional concerns and intentions.
2There are exceptions, however. First-order beliefs were measured, for example, by
Oﬀerman et al. (1996, 2001) and Sonnemans et al. (1997) in step-level public goods games;
1think that more attention should be given to measuring beliefs, along with
behavior. Few would doubt that human behavior in a strategic environ-
ment is, at least partly, driven by beliefs. Experimental data on beliefs and
behavior open up the possibility of analyzing a range of questions such as:
Are beliefs about others’ behavior and/or beliefs on average correct? Do
second-order (or even higher-order) beliefs inﬂuence behavior, given ﬁrst-
order beliefs? Are speciﬁc models of behavior that are based on underlying
beliefs compatible with observations? Our paper addresses questions of this
sort.
We focus on the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), which ex-
tends Rabin’s (1993) model of reciprocal kindness to extensive form games.3
The sequential structure of an extensive form game calls for a sequential re-
vision of beliefs as the game proceeds. When beliefs are sequentially revised,
the equilibrium outcome can be dramatically diﬀerent from the outcome of
by Oﬀerman (2002) in a “hot response game” designed to measure the relative eﬀect of
helpful vs. hurtful intentions; by Croson (1999, 2000, forthcoming) in linear public goods
games, prisoner’s dilemmas, and games with iterated dominance; and by Croson and
Miller (2004) in a battle-of-the-sexes game with exit. First- and second-order beliefs
were measured by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) in a lost wallet game; by Bacharach
et al. (forthcoming) and Guerra and Zizzo (2004) in trust games; and by Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) in a trust game with hidden action. The psychology literature includes
many studies of the relationship between ﬁrst-order beliefs and behavior in public goods
(or commons) games and prisoner’s dilemmas (e.g., Dawes et al., 1977; Messé and Sivacek,
1979; Yamagishi and Sato, 1986).
3The model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) also applies to extensive form games. In
their model, agents respond to the perceived intentions of other agents while also taking
into account the distribution of payoﬀs. Initial beliefs are not revised, however.
2the normal form game. As an example, in Rabin’s model, unconditional co-
operation in the prisoner’s dilemma is an equilibrium as long as reciprocity
considerations are suﬃciently strong. This equilibrium requires each player
to believe that the other player is cooperating. In a sequential version of
the prisoner’s dilemma, however, the second-mover cannot plausibly main-
tain this belief once she observes that the ﬁrst-mover has defected. In short,
the nature of extensive form games aﬀects beliefs as play unfolds and hence
alters the conditions for best responses and equilibrium behavior.
We examine the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (henceforth, DK)
using experimental data on behavior and beliefs. We ran two experiments:
a one-shot sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD; Bolle and Ockenfels, 1990)
and a one-shot mini-ultimatum game (MUG; Bolton and Zwick, 1995, and
Gale et al., 1995). These games and closely related ones have been the
subject of numerous experimental studies, but never–to the best of our
knowledge–have beliefs been measured. The games have the simplest pos-
sible sequential structure (two players, one after the other, choose between
two actions), and both have a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
H o w e v e r ,e x p e r i m e n t sh a v er e v e a l e ds y s t e m a t i cd e v i a t i o n sf r o mt h i se q u i l i b -
rium. In the SPD, ﬁrst-movers frequently cooperate, as do second-movers if
3the ﬁrst-mover cooperates. In the MUG, many ﬁrst-movers make 50/50 pro-
posals, and some second-movers reject “unfair” proposals. These deviations
have often been interpreted as evidence of reciprocity, thereby–explicitly or
implicitly–referring to intentions and beliefs.4 We investigate whether this
interpretation is supported by an analysis, using DK’s model, of experimen-
tal data on behavior and beliefs. Our data on behavior are broadly in line
with previous experimental ﬁndings. With regard to reciprocity, our analysis
is twofold.
First, in Section 2, we determine for each subject whether or not her be-
havior, given her beliefs, is in agreement with the predictions of DK’s model.
This is possible because, as DK (p. 291) note, a subject’s beliefs (includ-
ing second-order beliefs) determine the material payoﬀ and the “reciprocity
payoﬀ” components of her utility. This yields a best-response test for each
subject. Our experimental data on the SPD match the predictions of DK’s
model to the following extent: about 80% of the ﬁrst-movers and 100% of
the second-movers passed the best-response test. First-movers who failed to
4Deviations from the SPNE have been found, for example, by Clark and Sefton (2001) in
the SPD; by Fehr et al. (1993, 1997, 1998) and Charness (2004) in gift-exchange games with
the essential features of an SPD; by Brandts and Solà (2001) and Falk et al. (2003) in the
MUG; and almost universally in ultimatum games (for an overview, see Camerer, 2003). In
most of the studies cited, supporting evidence for the reciprocity interpretation comes from
variations in the treatment or from subjects’ answers to questionnaires, but beliefs were
not measured. Charness and Rabin (2002) similarly advance the reciprocity interpretation,
based on an impressive array of dictatorship and dictatorship-deferral experiments.
4pass the test were nearly always cooperators. When defection was unam-
biguously the best response for the ﬁrst-mover, about 75% defected. In the
MUG, again, about 80% of the ﬁrst-movers and 100% of the second-movers
passed the best-response test. All ﬁrst-movers who failed to pass the test
made 50/50 proposals. When the ﬁrst-mover’s best response was to divide
the pie unequally (i.c. 70/30), only 60% did so.
Second, in Section 3, we examine to what extent average behavior and
beliefs, across subjects, are compatible with sequential reciprocity equibrium
play as in DK’s theory. Thus we view the cross-section of subjects as a
single player, which is in line with Nash’s mass-action interpretation of equi-
librium play. This involves (i) testing whether average behavior coincides
with average (ﬁrst- and second-order) beliefs and (ii) checking whether av-
erage behavior is a best response, given beliefs. In our SPD data, we found
that average play and beliefs are remarkably well in line with the equilib-
rium conditions. This is less so in the MUG data, where the ﬁrst-mover’s
average behavior does not support the model. One interesting novel ﬁnding,
both in the SPD and in the MUG, is that, while beliefs varied widely across
subjects, average ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs are almost always remark-
ably close to average behavior, that is, ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs were
5found to be unbiased. There is only one exception: in the MUG, ﬁrst-movers
signiﬁcantly overestimated the second-mover’s rejection rate of 70/30 pro-
posals, and second-movers underestimated the ﬁrst-mover’s estimate of that
rejection rate. Note that consistency of beliefs with behavior involves com-
parisons across ﬁrst- and second-movers and that the games were played
one-shot, i.e. without any possibility of learning.
Section 4 concludes. An appendix contains the technical derivations.
The details of the experimental protocol and the raw data are available as
supplementary material.
2 Best-response analysis
Consider a two-player extensive form game where each player has to choose
between two actions. Player A must choose ﬁrst. Player B chooses second
after observing A’s choice. DK’s model of this strategic interaction is as
follows. Each player i maximizes the sum of her material payoﬀ and her
reciprocity payoﬀ,
Ui = πi + Yiκiλi,
given the updated beliefs that she holds at her decision node. Here, πi is
i’s material payoﬀ, which depends on her choice and on her belief about the
6choice of j, the other player. Further, Yi ≥ 0 is i’s sensitivity to reciprocity
(a parameter); κi is i’s kindness to j, which depends on i’s choice and on
i’s belief about j’s choice; and λi is i’s belief about κj, which depends on
i’s belief about j’s choice and on i’s belief about j’s belief about i’s choice.
Player i’s kindness to j is the material payoﬀ i “ i n t e n d s ”t og i v et oj in excess
of j’s “equitable” payoﬀ. This equitable payoﬀ, πe
j, depends on the material
payoﬀs j can possibly get. Speciﬁcally,





minπj +m a xπj
2
,
where the minimum and the maximum are taken over i’s eﬃcient strate-
gies (i.e. those strategies of i for which no other strategy guarantees, for all
strategies of j, at least equally large material payoﬀsf o rb o t hp l a y e r sa n d ,
for some strategy of j,al a r g e rm a t e r i a lp a y o ﬀ for at least one player). DK
assume that players update their beliefs as follows. After A made her choice,
B believes this choice was made deliberately, i.e. with probability 1, while
B ’ sb e l i e fa b o u tA ’ sb e l i e fa b o u tB ’ ss u b s e q u e n tc h o i c er e m a i n su n a l t e r e d . 5
We test the predictions of DK’s model using the following simple idea.
Call player i’s behavior, given her beliefs, a material best response if her
5Although without strategic relevance, A updates her beliefs accordingly: after she
made her choice, she believes B believes she made this choice deliberately, while she
maintains her prior belief about B’s subsequent choice.
7choice maximizes πi,a n dareciprocity best response if her choice maximizes
κiλi. Because there are only two strategies available to choose from, if i’s
behavior is indeed to maximize Ui, it must be either a material best response,
or a reciprocity best response, or both. If we observe i’s choice and beliefs,
we can simply check whether this choice maximizes πi and/or κiλi, and hence
classify i’s behavior as being
(i) a material best response and a reciprocity best response;
(ii) a material best response only;
(iii) a reciprocity best response only;
(iv) neither a material best response nor a reciprocity best response.
This classiﬁcation yields a test of DK’s model at the individual level: subjects
in category (iv) do not behave according to the theory. The approach is
simple and avoids augmenting DK’s model with further assumptions that
would inevitably come with statistical models of choice behavior. Moreover,
the classiﬁcation (i)—(iv) sheds light on the relative power of material vs.
reciprocity considerations in explaining observed behavior.
Our approach has more general applicability. Any model of rational choice
in which utility is separable into two or more observable “components” (here,
material payoﬀ and reciprocity payoﬀ) and in which utility increases in each
8component, yields the testable implication that no dominated choice will be
made. That is, an individual’s choice must, in all pairwise comparisons with
the other choices available, yield the highest value of at least one utility com-
ponent. Thus, our method can be applied in strategic settings where more
than two choices are available (including continua) and where other, perhaps
more than two, utility components are considered. The key requirement is
that the rank of each available choice be observed for each utility compo-
nent separately. Note, also, that additive separability is not needed: the
model Ui = f(πi,κ iλi),w i t hf increasing in each argument, yields the same
testable prediction as DK’s model. This has a further advantage. In DK’s
model, and also in Rabin’s, preferences are not invariant with respect to the
material payoﬀ unit. As DK note, a slight modiﬁcation of the model renders
preferences invariant. In our best-response analysis, the consequences of lack
of invariance are avoided altogether.
Note that our approach to testing DK’s theory constitutes a rather strin-
gent test in the sense that we do not distinguish between the qualitative
aspects of the theory (such as the sequential revision of beliefs and the
monotonic eﬀects of intentions on utility) and its quantitative speciﬁcations
(for example, the equitable payoﬀ as the mid-point of the payoﬀ range, which
9plays a critical role). Hence, if a rejection is encountered, it cannot be at-
tributed to the failure of the essential ingredients of the theory or to the
incorrectness of some of the quantitative speciﬁcations. This remark also
applies to the equilibrium test in Section 3.
2.1 The sequential prisoner’s dilemma
The game. Consider the game depicted in Figure 1. Player A cooperates (C)
or defects (D); player B observes A’s choice and then decides to cooperate















Figure 1: The sequential prisoner’s dilemma.
10Beliefs and best responses. To introduce beliefs, let
p =P r [ A chooses C],
qc|C =P r [ B chooses c | Ac h o o s e sC],
qd|D =P r [ B chooses d | A chooses D],
and let q =( qc|C,q d|D).P r i o rt op l a y ,l e tp0 be B’s belief about p and let p00
be A’s belief about p0; similarly, let q0 be A’s belief about q and let q00 be
B’s belief about q0. Given these beliefs, the material best response and the
reciprocity best response are as follows and lead to the classiﬁcation (i)—(iv)
above.
STATEMENT 1: F o rp l a y e rA ,
C is a material best response ⇐⇒ 6q
0
c|C ≥ 8 − 6q
0
d|D,
C is a reciprocity best response ⇐⇒ 6p
00q
0
c|C +6 ( 1− p
00)(1 − q
0
d|D) − 3 ≥ 0;
and the reverse holds for D.6 For player B, the material best response is d,
regardless of A’s choice; the reciprocity best response is c if A chose C and
d if A chose D.
6That is, D is a material best response or a reciprocity best response if and only if the
corresponding reverse inequality holds.
11PROOF:
The players’ material best responses are straightforward. With regard
to reciprocity, A’s choice of C is unambiguously kind, as is B’s choice of c
following C,a n dB ’ sc h o i c eo fc following D. Any other choice is unam-
biguously unkind. Hence B’s reciprocity best response is to choose c if A
chose C and d if A chose D. Given B’s prior beliefs, A’s equitable payoﬀ is
πe
A = 1



















C is a reciprocity best response if and only if λA ≥ 0.
Discussion. The formal analysis regarding reciprocity agrees well with intu-
ition. If q0
c|C and/or 1−q0
d|D are suﬃciently large, A believes she will receive
an equitable payoﬀ. Hence, she believes B to be kind and, quite apart from
utility derived from her material payoﬀ, she derives non-material utility from
acting kindly in response to anticipated kind behavior, by choosing C.T h e
converse is also true. If q0
c|C and/or 1−q0
d|D are too small, A believes she won’t
receive an equitable payoﬀ. Now she derives utility from being unkind, by
choosing D in response to anticipated unkind behavior. Player B, similarly,
12derives non-material utility from choosing c following C and d following D.
This matching of kindness with kindness and of unkindness with unkindness
is at the heart of the theory of reciprocity. Of course, whether players are
willing to forego material payoﬀ to respond to kindness with kindness and to
unkindness with unkindness, will depend on their sensitivity to reciprocity
and on the amount of material payoﬀ (they think) that must be foregone.
Experimental set-up. We ran a double-blind experiment where randomly
paired subjects played the SPD (with payoﬀsa si nF i g u r e1 ,i ne u r o s )a n d
reported their prior beliefs. The experiment was run in 2005 at the Univer-
sity of Antwerp, Belgium. The participants were second-year undergraduate
students in business and economics.7 There was one experimental session,
with 132 participants equally divided between two rooms: room A, where
the subjects assumed the role of player A; and room B, where the subjects
assumed the role of player B. The subjects played the game once; there was
no repeated play or role reversal. The experiment was carried out sequen-
7They were recruited via an announcement in class one week before the experiment. It
was announced that they could participate in an experiment on decision making in which
they could earn some money. The participants had to register for the experiment. There
was no show-up fee. Two monitors, recruited on a voluntary basis from the subject pool at
the time of announcement, assisted throughout the experiment, including payment to the
subjects. The monitors were paid a wage of 10 euros per hour. The experimental protocol
and the instructions (translated from the Dutch original) are available as supplementary
material.
13tially, the ﬁrst part in room A and the second part in room B. This enabled
us to elicit B’s choice using the direct-response method. That is, the B’s
responded by choosing c or d after observing A’s choice, C or D.T h ee x p e r -
i m e n tt o o ka b o u t3 0m i n u t e si ne a c hr o o m .T h eA ’ sc o u l dn o tc o m m u n i c a t e
with the B’s between the two parts. The subjects were also asked to report
their prior beliefs. There were two short questionnaires (one for the A’s, one
for the B’s) with three questions each, measuring
(q0
c|C,q0
d|D,p 00) for the subjects in room A,
(p0,q 00
c|C,q00
d|D) for the subjects in room B.
For example, to measure q0
c|C we asked the subjects in room A [italics added]:
“What percentage of people in room B who learned that the person from
room A with whom he/she is paired chose option A1 [meaning C] will sub-
sequently choose option B1 [meaning c]?”; and to measure q00
c|C we asked the
subjects in room B: “What is the average answer of the people in room A to
question a1 above [referring to the former question]?” The questions had to
be answered after the instructions were given but before playing. A’s choice
(C or D) was disclosed to the corresponding B after B had answered the
questions.8 To elicit beliefs, a bonus of 3 euros was given for each answer
8We note that the questionnaires, inevitably, became part of the framing and hence may
have aﬀected behavior. Croson (1999, 2000) found that belief elicitation reduces coopera-
tion in public goods and prisoner’s dilemma experiments, thus pushing behavior towards
14that deviated no more than 5 percentage points from the true percentage.9
The experiment was set up in such a way that the material payoﬀs, the ques-
tionnaires to both players, the bonus system, the direct-response feature, and
anonimity were common knowledge.
Experimental results. The average earnings per subject (including bonuses)
were 4.5 euro for player A and 4.92 euro for player B. Table 1 gives the average
Nash equilibrium. Sonnemans et al. (1998), however, found no eﬀect of belief elicitation
on behavior in step-level public goods games. Potential eﬀects of belief elicitation could
not be avoided in our set-up, given that B’s choice was elicited using the direct-response
method, which rules out measuring prior beliefs post-play. There is, however, a poten-
tially important advantage of measuring beliefs prior to play. Belief elicitation, whether
pre- or post-play, explicitly invites subjects to reﬂect on the strategic situation. In case of
post-play belief elicitation, subjects may–on second thought, triggered by the questions–
change their views of the situation and report beliefs that diﬀer from the (perhaps more
vague) beliefs on which their strategic choice was based. Pre-play belief elicitation, using
questions as an integral part of the instructions, is more likely to succeed in accurately
measuring true beliefs associated with the strategic choices made. Even if belief elicitation
alters behavior, it is unclear if it alters subjects’ preferences over material payoﬀsa n d
reciprocity payoﬀs in any particular direction.
9As Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) note, reported beliefs elicited in this way may
deviate somewhat from true beliefs, deﬁned as the mean of the subject’s prior distribution.
The incentive scheme, while simple, invites rational subjects to report the midpoint of the
10% interval with the highest prior probability, not the prior mean. Thus, for example,
rational players would never report beliefs less than 5% or greater than 95%. This sort
of measurement error is presumably small. We also ignore the possibility that (some)
subjects deliberately try to inﬂuence the bonuses that other subjects receive for suﬃciently
accurate beliefs. This seems justiﬁed by the large number of participants. A more serious
(but unavoidable) complication arises from the increased likelihood that subjects make
unintentional errors when making up beliefs, compared to the relatively more simple task
of choosing between two strategies (e.g., C and D). The likelihood of making unintentional
errors, no doubt, further increases when subjects have to make up beliefs about other
subjects’ beliefs. As a byproduct, some clever players may realize all this and incorporate
this in their reported beliefs. For example, it suﬃces that some A’s misinterpret the
question asking to report their belief q0
d|D as asking to report q0
c|D =1− q0
d|D (a careful
inspection of the raw data shows that this almost certainly happened) to have a dramatic
eﬀect on the average of the reported beliefs. Some B’s may anticipate this sort of error
and reduce their reported q00
d|D accordingly.
15behavior and beliefs.10 There is a striking agreement between the average
behavior, the average beliefs about behavior, and the average beliefs about
those beliefs. This will be analyzed formally in Section 3, where equilibrium
behavior is investigated.
Using Statement 1, the subjects were classiﬁed according to their material
best response and their reciprocity best response as implied by their beliefs.
Table 2 reports the behavioral rates within each category (A’s behavior in the
upper part; B’s behavior in the lower part). For example, the ﬁrst row shows
that 6 A’s had beliefs that implied C was both a material best response
and a reciprocity best response; 4 of these A’s chose C and 2 chose D.
These 2 D-choices are neither a material best response nor a reciprocity best
response, which is indicated by a “∗”. When C was a material best response
and D a reciprocity best response, 6 out of the 7 subjects chose C. For these
subjects κA > 0 and λA < 0 (recall that κA is A’s kindness to B and λA is A’s
belief about B’s kindness to A), which indicates low sensitivity to reciprocity.
Conversely, when D was a material best response and C a reciprocity best
response, 5 out of the 6 subjects chose C. In the remaining case, where D
was both a material best response and a reciprocity best response, 35 out of
10The raw data on behavior and beliefs and the material and reciprocity best responses
implied by beliefs are available as supplementary material.
16Table 1: Average behavior and beliefs in the SPD
A’s choice B’s choice
A’s C-rate 0.41 (27/66) B’s c-rate following C 0.37 (10/27)
B’s average p0 0.35 (n =6 6 ) A’s average q0
c|C 0.28 (n =6 6 )
A’s average p00 0.44 (n =6 6 ) B’s average q00
c|C 0.30 (n =6 6 )
B’s d-rate following D 1( 3 9 /39)
A’s average q0
d|D 0.84 (n =6 6 )
B’s average q00
d|D 0.88 (n =6 6 )
Table 2: Best-response analysis of behavior in the SPD
A’s best response A’s behavior
material reciprocity A’s C-rate A’s D-rate
CC (n =6 ) 0 .67 (4/6) 0.33 (2/6)∗
CD (n =7 ) 0 .86 (6/7) 0.14 (1/7)
DC (n =6 ) 0 .83 (5/6) 0.17 (1/6)
DD (n =4 7 ) 0 .26 (12/47)∗ 0.74 (35/47)
A’s B’s best response B’s behavior
behavior material reciprocity B’s c-rate B’s d-rate
Cd c (n =2 7 ) 0 .37 (10/27) 0.63 (17/27)
Dd d (n =3 9 ) 0 ( 0 /39)∗ 1( 3 9 /39)
Note: ∗ indicates behavior that is neither a material best response
nor a reciprocity best response.
17the 47 subjects chose D (with κA and λA both negative), and 12 out of the 47
subjects chose C, which is neither a material best response nor a reciprocity
best response. In the latter group, arguably the most interesting, the typical
belief pattern is as follows: q0
c|C is small, q0
d|D is large, and p00 is moderate to
large; hence A believes that B is unkind and that D will yield the highest
material payoﬀ, but she still chooses C. The typical beliefs do not suggest
obvious unintentional errors, which makes it diﬃcult to understand why these
subjects chose C.L o wv a l u e so fq0
c|C combined with a C-choice might suggest
unconditional altruism. But then one would equally expect some B’s to be
unconditional altruists and, when confronted with A’s choice of D,t ot u r n
the other cheek and choose c; but not a single subject, out of the 39, did
so.11 It seems that other emotions made some subjects choose C, perhaps
hope or guilt-aversion. The results for the A’s may also be summarised as
follows: out of the 66 cases, A’s behavior was a material best response in 46
cases, a reciprocity best response in 45 cases, and a material or reciprocity
best response in 52 cases (or 79%).
Now consider the B’s. Following A’s choice of C, B’s choice must be
11In this respect, note the following. An unconditionally altruistic B may choose c
following A’s choice of C because she is willing to give up 2 to increase A’s material payoﬀ
by 6; 10 out of the 27 B’s did so. But now, following A’s choice of D, an unconditionally
altruistic B faces the same question: will she give up 2 to increase A’s material payoﬀ by 6?
Nobody did. Thus, when both agents exert control over the course of events, unconditional
altruism vanishes.
18either a material best response (d, which occurred 17 times out of the 27) or
a reciprocity best response (c, which occurred 10 times out of the 27). Thus,
while DK’s theory is in line with either of B’s choices following A’s choice
of C,i ti sn o n - f a l s i ﬁable in this particular instance. Following A’s choice
of D,h o w e v e r ,t h eonly possible best response of B is to choose d,t h u s
maximizing her material and reciprocity payoﬀs. In line with the predictions
of DK’s theory, this occurred in all of the 39 cases.
2.2 The mini-ultimatum game
The game. Consider the mini-ultimatum game depicted in Figure 2. Player A
proposes dividing an amount equally (E)o ru n e q u a l l y( U); player B observes
A’s choice and then decides to accept (a) or to reject (r) the proposal. The
material payoﬀs are given at the end nodes.
Beliefs and best responses. Let
p =P r [ A chooses E],
qa|E =P r [ B chooses a | A chooses E],
qr|U =P r [ B chooses r | Ac h o o s e sU],
and let q =( qa|E,q r|U).L e tp0 be B’s belief about p and p00 A’s belief about















Figure 2: The mini-ultimatum game.
STATEMENT 2: F o rp l a y e rA ,





and the reverse holds for E.I fp00(1−q0
a|E)=( 1−p00)q0
r|U =0 , E and U are
reciprocity best responses; otherwise,





and the reverse holds for E. For player B, the material best response is a,
regardless of A’s choice; following A’s choice of U (resp., E),





and the reverse holds for a (resp., r).
20PROOF:
The material best responses are straightforward. Regarding reciprocity,
because B’s only Pareto-optimal strategy is to always choose a, A’s equitable
payoﬀ, given B’s prior beliefs, is πe
A =5 p0 +7 ( 1− p0)=7− 2p0. Hence A’s




a|E +7 ( 1− p
00)(1 − q
0









Clearly, λA ≤ 0, with equality if and only if p00(1 − q0
a|E)=( 1− p00)q0
r|U =0 .
If λA =0 , E and U are reciprocity best responses. If λA < 0,Ab e l i e v e sBi s
unkind. Hence, her reciprocity best response is to choose the least favorable
outcome for B, which is U if 3 − 3q0
r|U ≤ 5q0
a|E,a n dE if 3 − 3q0
r|U ≥ 5q0
a|E.
Following A’s choice of U, B believes A is unkind if 3 − 3q00
r|U ≤ 5q00
a|E,w i t h
reciprocity best response r, and kind if 3 − 3q00
r|U ≥ 5q00
a|E, with reciprocity
best response a. Following A’s choice of E, the reverse holds.
Discussion. In this game, reciprocity is exclusively negative. This corre-
sponds well with general intuition as concerns player B, who may reject the
unequal division. In DK’s model, by the nature of reciprocity, this carries
over to player A. The formal result is driven by B having only one Pareto-
optimal strategy: to choose a, irrespective of A’s choice. Following DK, this
21prescribes B’s equitable behavior as always choosing a, but with zero kind-
ness. Any other behavior is unkind. Hence, whenever p00(1 − q0
a|E) 6=0or
(1 − p00)q0
r|U 6=0 , A anticipates negative kindness, so her reciprocity best
response is to choose the worst outcome for B, which is, most likely, U.12 If
Ac h o o s e sU, B most likely interprets this as unkind (correctly so, if A’s and
B’s beliefs agree), and her reciprocity best response is to choose the worst
outcome for A, which is r.
Experimental set-up. W er a na ne x p e r i m e n ti n2 0 0 5a tt h eU n i v e r s i t yo f
Leuven, Belgium, where the subjects played the MUG (with payoﬀsa si n
Figure 2, in euros) and reported their prior beliefs. The experimental set-
up was identical to the set-up in the SPD experiment except for the payoﬀ
matrix. The participants were, again, second-year undergraduate students
in business and economics. There were 172 participants: 88 in room A, who
assumed the role of player A, and 84 in room B, who assumed the role of
player B.13
Experimental results. The average earnings per subject were 9.49 euro for
12Indeed, 3 − 3q0
r|U ≤ 5q0
a|E in all likelihood.
13D u et os o m en o - s h o w s ,t h e r ew e r e4r o o mAs u b j e c t sw h oc o u l dn o tb ep a i r e dw i t ha
room B subject (this became clear after completion of the room A part of the experiment,
so it had no eﬀect on behavior or beliefs of the room A subjects); these subjects received
the average payoﬀ of the room A subjects who made the same choice.
22player A, and 6.42 euro for player B. Table 3 reports the average behavior and
beliefs. There is a reasonable agreement between average behavior, beliefs,
and beliefs about beliefs, but with one clear exception: the rejection rate of
unequal divisions. The B’s rejected the unequal division in only 9% of the
cases (4 out of the 44), while the A’s, on average, estimated that the B’s would
reject 34% of the unequal divisions, and the B’s, on average, estimated that
the A’s, on average, would estimate the rejection rate of unequal divisions at
18%.
For player A, as one might expect from the formal analysis, U was almost
always a reciprocity best response (87 out of the 88 cases). U was also a
material best response in most cases (56 out of the 88). When E was a
material best response and U a reciprocity best response, the A’s chose E
more often (20 out of the 32) than U (12 out of the 32), acting kindly in
response to unkind behavior but in their own material interest. When U was
both a material and a reciprocity best response, most A’s indeed chose U (35
out of the 55), as predicted, but a sizeable proportion chose E (20 out of the
55), which is not in agreement with DK’s theory. Perhaps these subjects,
anticipating that any division would likely be accepted, also took fairness of
the outcome into consideration as a behavioral motivation. Consideration of
23Table 3: Average behavior and beliefs in the MUG
A’s choice B’s choice
A’s E-rate 0.45 (40/88) B’s a-rate following E 1( 4 0 /40)
B’s average p0 0.33 (n =8 4 ) A’s average q0
a|E 0.93 (n =8 8 )
A’s average p00 0.47 (n =8 8 ) B’s average q00
a|E 0.95 (n =8 4 )
B’s r-rate following U 0.09 (4/44)
A’s average q0
r|U 0.34 (n =8 8 )
B’s average q00
r|U 0.18 (n =8 4 )
Table 4: Best-response analysis of behavior in the MUG
A’s best response A’s behavior
material reciprocity A’s E-rate A’s U-rate
EE (n =0 ) − (0/0) − (0/0)∗
EU (n =3 2 ) 0 .63 (20/32) 0.38 (12/32)
UE (n =1 ) 0 ( 0 /1) 1 (1/1)
UU (n =4 9 ) 0 .39 (19/49)∗ 0.61 (30/49)
UE , U (n =6 ) 0 .17 (1/6) 0.83 (5/6)
A’s B’s best response B’s behavior
behavior material reciprocity B’s a-rate B’s r-rate
Ea a (n =3 9 ) 1 ( 3 9 /39) 0 (0/39)∗
Ea r (n =1 ) 1 ( 1 /1) 0 (0/1)
Ua a (n =0 ) − (0/0)∗ − (0/0)
Ua r (n =4 4 ) 0 .91 (40/44) 0.09 (4/44)
Note: ∗ indicates behavior that is neither a material best response
nor a reciprocity best response.
24fairness of the ﬁnal allocation, independently of how it comes about, is not
present in DK’s theory. To sum up: out of the 88 cases, A’s behavior is a
material best response in 56 cases, a reciprocity best response in 48 cases,
and a material or reciprocity best response in 69 cases (or 78%).
As for the B’s, the observed behavior is entirely as DK’s theory predicts.
Naturally, the reciprocity best response was almost always (83 out of the 84)
to accept the equal division and to reject the unequal division. Following
A’s choice of E, all B’s (40 out of the 40) accepted. Following A’s choice of
U, most B’s (40 out of the 44) accepted, which was in their material interest
but against reciprocity considerations; some B’s (4 out of the 44) retaliated
by rejecting the unequal division.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In two-player, two-stage games, a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE)
is a strategy proﬁle–a prescription of each player’s (randomized) choice at
her decision node–such that, for each player, the prescribed choice is a best
response, given sequentially updated beliefs that coincide with the strategy
proﬁle. In this section we derive and interpret the SRE in the games consid-
ered, and compare the SRE with the experimental data.
It makes little sense to maintain that, in real-world populations, all sub-
25jects behave identically and hold the same beliefs. Hence, experimentally
testing whether individual play is in agreement with an SRE does not seem
to be a fruitful approach. Bearing in mind that the subjects played the game
one-shot, with no possibility of learning, no communication, or any other
coordination means, one would hardly expect the formidable SRE restric-
tions on individual behavior and beliefs to hold. Moreover, even if players
are rational, with utilities exactly as speciﬁed and commonly known, there is
often (as in games with material payoﬀs only) an indeterminacy arising from
the multiplicity of equilibria. Depending on the sensitivity of the players to
reciprocity there may, indeed, be multiple SREs in the games considered.
In our experimental analysis we focus, instead, on the hypothesis that
average play at the population level is in agreement with an SRE. This cor-
responds, roughly, to interpreting the population of A’s as a single player,
and similarly for the population of B’s. Our test involves: (i) a consistency
test (average behavior, average ﬁrst-order beliefs, and average second-order
beliefs all coincide); (ii) a best-response check (each player’s average behav-
ior is a best response, given beliefs that equal average behavior). We regard
t h es u b j e c t si no u re x p e r i m e n t sa sa ni n d e p e n d e n ts a m p l ef r o mt h ep o p u l a -
tion and their average behavior and beliefs as estimates of the corresponding
26population averages. For the consistency test, we use a χ2 statistic that al-
lows within-subject correlation between behavior and beliefs, while imposing
independence across subjects. For the best-response check we use Statements
1 and 2, with beliefs set to average behavior.
3.1 The sequential prisoner’s dilemma
Sequential reciprocity equilibria.14 Statement 3 in the Appendix gives a pre-
cise description of the SRE, which depend on the players’ sensitivities to
reciprocity, YA and YB. The key features are as follows. Player B’s SRE
behavior is unique: when A defects, B always defects; when A cooperates,
B always defects when YB is small enough, always cooperates when YB is
large enough, and cooperates with a probability that increases from 0 to 1
as YB increases in some intermediate range. This is in line with intuition.
Player A’s SRE behavior may or may not be unique. In essentially all cases
(that is, except for speciﬁcv a l u e so fYA or YB), either there is a unique SRE
or there are three SREs. When the SRE is unique, A’s SRE behavior is in
pure strategies: either A always cooperates, or A always defects. When there
are three SREs, each of A’s pure strategies is an SRE strategy; in the third
SRE, A plays a mixed strategy. Which SRE(s) tend(s) to emerge? When YB
14The discussion here complements that in DK, where the SRE are derived for other
payoﬀ values.
27is small enough, the SRE is unique and coincides with the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the material game, in which both players defect. When
YB is large enough, reciprocal cooperation is always an SRE, because A, an-
ticipating positive reciprocity from B, will (ex ante) positively reciprocate
even if she is not, or is only weakly, motivated by reciprocity, because it is in
her material interest to do so. For intermediate values of YB, the SRE tends
to be unique (depending on YA, however): either A always defects (when YB
is below a threshold), or always cooperates (when YB i sa b o v et h a tt h r e s h -
old). This is because intermediate values of YB imply intermediate values of
B’s kindness, hence A will hardly be motivated to reward or punish B, so
A’s concern for material payoﬀ will tend to dominate. The eﬀect of YA on
the SRE is as follows. As YA increases, the set of SRE generally enlarges,
because then also an SRE with negative reciprocity emerges (and an inter-
mediate SRE, where A plays a mixed strategy) in which A, anticipating B’s
negative reciprocity if A defects, has more reason to defect. Thus, while an
increase in YB creates possibilities of escaping from the Nash outcome, an
increase in YA entails the danger of a fall-back to it as the result of intense
negative reciprocity.
Experimental results. Consistency of average behavior with beliefs and beliefs
28about beliefs is expressed by the joint hypothesis
H0 : p = p
0 = p










6 statistic accociated with H0 equals 56.72, with a p-value very close
to zero, which runs counter to the informal conclusion we drew earlier. The
reason for this anomaly is as follows. Not surprisingly, all B’s chose d after
Ac h o s eD. Hence the estimate of qd|D is 1, with zero standard error. On the
other hand, the estimates of q0
d|D and q00
d|D are, respectively, 0.84 and 0.88,
with small enough standard errors to make them signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
1. As we argued, the incentive scheme is likely to introduce a negative bias in
the reported beliefs when true beliefs are close to 1. To purge the test result
of this potential source of bias, we tested the slightly weaker hypothesis
H
0
0 : p = p
0 = p









which, arguably, contains all interesting pieces of H0.T h eχ2
5 statistic now
equals 6.05, with p-value 0.30, thus giving empirical support to H0
0.
For the best-response check, we set p0 = p00 =0 .41 (A’s C-rate), q0
c|C =
q00
c|C =0 .37 (B’s c-rate following C), and q0
d|D = q00
d|D =1(B’s d-rate following
D). Given these presumed SRE beliefs, we need to check whether p =0 .41,
f o rp l a y e rA ,a n dqc|C =0 .37 and qd|D =1 , for player B, are best responses.
29Whether or not a strategy is a best response for player i depends, in general,
on i’s sensitivity to reciprocity, Yi. Our approach, in line with the analysis
in the previous section, is to check whether there exists Yi ≥ 0 such that
the presumed SRE strategy is a best response for player i.F o r p l a y e r A ,
it follows from Statement 1 that C is a material best response and D is a
reciprocity best response. Hence, for some unique YA > 0,b o t hC and D
maximize A’s utility, and p =0 .41 is a best response. For player B, by
Statement 1, qc|C =0 .37 is a best response for some unique YB > 0,a n d
qd|D =1is the only best response, regardless of YB.T h u s ,b o t hA ’ sa n dB ’ s
average behavior pass the best-response check.
Even though we had to reject qd|D = q00
d|D and qd|D = q0
d|D (in part due
to our incentive scheme to elicit q0
d|D and q00
d|D), our overall conclusion is
that average play, average beliefs, and average beliefs about beliefs in our
experimental data are remarkably well in line with the stringent restrictions
that SRE behavior imposes.
3.2 The mini-ultimatum game
Sequential reciprocity equilibria. Statement 4 in the Appendix describes the
SRE. Neither of the players’ SRE behavior is necessarily unique when their
sensitivity to reciprocity is large. When YB is small enough, B always accepts
30A’s proposal, because her material payoﬀ considerations dominate. When B
always accepts any proposal, A always proposes the unequal division. This
SRE coincides with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the material
game. When YB is large enough, B’s SRE behavior requires some form of
retaliation. B’s “natural” SRE behavior, then, is to accept the equal division
and to reject the unequal division. Somewhat couterintuitively, B’s retalia-
tion can also take the form of accepting the unequal division and rejecting
the equal division. Rejection, in either form of retaliation, occurs either with
probability 1 or with some probability less than 1 (a mixed-strategy SRE). In
SRE where B rejects the unequal division with positive probability, propos-
ing the unequal division is still SRE behavior of A, provided the rejection
probability is suﬃciently small or YA is suﬃciently large. Conversely, when
the (unequal division) rejection probability is large and YA is small, the only
SRE strategy of A is to propose the equal division, which B accepts. Finally,
when both YA and YB are large, there are many SREs, including retaliatory
ones where A deliberately makes a proposal that B will reject.
Experimental results. The hypothesis of consistency,
H0 : p = p
0 = p










6 statistic equal to 56.72, with a p-value very close to zero. As in the
31SPD, the test result is potentially biased by our incentive scheme to elicit
beliefs. Understandably, all B’s chose a after A chose E, hence the estimate
of qa|E is 1. The estimates of q0
a|E and q00
a|E, while only slightly smaller (0.93
and 0.95, respectively) and likely to be biased, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
1 .T oe x c l u d et h eb i a se ﬀect, we applied the test to
H
0












5 statistic of 24.08, with p-value 0.00021. As noted above, it is
primarily the part qr|U = q0
r|U = q00
r|U of H0
0 that has to be rejected (the
corresponding χ2
2 statistic is 19.14, with p-value 0.00007; the complementary
part of H0
0 gives χ2
3 =9 .61, with p-value 0.022). All in all, compared to
t h eS P D ,o u re x p e r i m e n t a ld a t ao nt h eM U Ga r el e s si nl i n ew i t ht h eS R E
requirement that behavior equals beliefs and beliefs about beliefs.
With p0 = p00 =0 .45 (A’s E-rate), q0
a|E = q00
a|E =1(B’s a-rate following
E), and q0
r|U = q00
r|U =0 .09 (B’s r-rate following U), E is neither a material
best response nor a reciprocity best response, hence p =0 .45 is not a best
response.15 This is in line with the earlier ﬁnding that many A’s chose E
against their material and reciprocity interests. For player B, it follows from
15Parenthetically, given A’s own average beliefs, E is a material best response (although
only marginally so) and U is a reciprocity best response, so there exists a unique YA > 0
such that p =0 .45 is a best response.
32Statement 2 that qa|E =1is the only best response, regardless of YB,a n d
that qr|U =0 .09 is a best response for some unique YB > 0.S oB ’ sa v e r a g e
behavior passes the best-response check. Nevertheless, our overall conclusion
is that average behavior and beliefs in the MUG are diﬃcult to reconcile with
SRE play.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we confronted Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004) theory
of sequential reciprocity with experimental data on behavior and beliefs ob-
tained from a sequential prisoner’s dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. To
test the theory, we checked whether subjects’ behavior, given their beliefs
about the other player’s behavior and beliefs, could possibly be a best re-
sponse by material or reciprocity considerations. We found, in both games,
that the theory accounts for 80% of ﬁrst-movers’ behavior and fully accounts
for second movers’ behavior. Reciprocity considerations explain a sizeable
fraction of behavior that is not accounted for by material payoﬀ maximiza-
tion. Those ﬁr s t - m o v e r sw h od i dn o tb e h a v ei na c c o r d a n c ew i t ht h et h e o r y
were cooperators in the sequential prisoner’s dilemma and made 50/50 pro-
posals in the mini-ultimatum game. The latter devation from the theory’s
prediction, in particular, suggests that agents also value fairness of the dis-
33tribution of payoﬀs apart from reciprocity considerations. This ﬁnding is in
line with the conclusions in Fehr et al. (2003) that both intentions and distri-
butional considerations matter. At a more general level, as Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger note, reciprocity is to be regarded as one of many possible mo-
tivations that inﬂuence behavior, and the nature and speciﬁc circumstances
of the strategic interaction are likely to aﬀect those motivations diﬀerently.
Our tests do not distinguish between the qualitative aspects and the quan-
titative speciﬁcations of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s theory. To test only
the qualitative aspects, one would need to move in the direction of non-
parametric analysis in the spirit of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Cox et
al. (2007). We leave this for further study.
34Appendix
STATEMENT 3: In the sequential prisoner’s dilemma, player B’s SRE strat-








0 if YB ≤ 1
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3 − (3YB)−1 if 1




Player A’s SRE strategies, p∗, are as follows. If YA =0and YB = 1
8,t h e n
p∗ =[ 0 ,1].I fYA > 0 or YB 6= 1
8,t h e n
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
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0 ∈ p∗ if 1
3 ≤ YA or 8YB − 1 ≤ YA,
˘ p ∈ p∗ if
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2YA(9YB−1) if 0 <Y A and 1





3 <Y A and 1
6 ≤ YB.
PROOF:
Consider player B. Following A’s choice of D, B’s unique best response is
d, hence q∗








d|D. Hence, if A chooses
35C, B believes A’s kindness is λB =6 q00
c|C +8 ( 1− q00





d|D. Further, B’s kindness is κB =3if she subsequently chooses c,
and κB = −3 if she chooses d. Thus, following A’s choice of C,t h ed i ﬀerence
between B’s utility of choosing c and B’s utility of choosing d is





B’s best response is to choose c with probability qc|C =0if ∆UB < 0;a n y
qc|C ∈ [0,1] if ∆UB =0 ;a n dqc|C =1if ∆UB > 0. Upon imposing equilibrium
beliefs on the best response and solving for qc|C,au n i q u es o l u t i o n ,q∗
c|C,i s
obtained. Consider now player A. Her kindness is 4−q0
c|C−q0
d|D if she chooses
C,a n d−(4−q0
c|C−q0
d|D) if she chooses D, so the diﬀerence between her utility

















where the bracketed term is λA. A’s SRE strategies, p∗,a r ef o u n do ni m po s i n g
equilibrium beliefs and solving for A’s best response, which is to choose C
with probability p =0if ∆UA < 0;a n yp ∈ [0,1] if ∆UA =0 ;a n dp =1if










36If YA =0and YB = 1
8,t h e n∆UA(p∗)=0and p∗ =[ 0 ,1]. Consider now the
case where YA > 0 or YB 6= 1








This condition holds if and only if 1
3 ≤ YA or 8YB − 1 ≤ YA. Further, 1 ∈ p∗
if and only if ∆UA(1) ≥ 0 or, equivalently,
YA(2q
∗






If YB ≥ 1
7.5,t h e nq∗
c|C ≥ 1
2 and (1) holds for any YA ≥ 0.I f YB ≤ 1
8,t h e n
q∗
c|C ≤ 1
3, with equality if and only if YB = 1
8, so (1) cannot hold (recall we
are handling the case YA > 0 or YB 6= 1
8). If 1
8 <Y B < 1




and (1) can be rewritten as YA ≤ ZB. Hence 1 ∈ p∗ if and only if either
1
8 <Y B < 1
7.5 and YA ≤ ZB,o r 1
7.5 ≤ YB. The condition for a mixed SRE










∗ < 1. (2)
If YB ≥ 1
6,t h e nq∗
c|C =1and (2) holds if and only if p∗ = ˘ p and YA > 1
3.I f
1
8 <Y B < 1
6,t h e n1
3 <q ∗
c|C =3− (3YB)−1 < 1 and (2) can be rearranged as
p
∗YA =




37This condition holds if and only if YA > 8YB − 1 and p∗ = ˘ p<1.T oe n s u r e
˘ p<1 it is necessary and suﬃcient that either 1
7.5 ≤ YB,o rYB < 1
7.5 and

















If YB = 1
8 and YA > 0,t h e nq∗
c|C = 1
3 and (2) amounts to p∗YA = 3
2YA with
0 <p ∗ < 1, which cannot hold. Finally, if YB < 1




STATEMENT 4: In the mini-ultimatum game, player B’s SRE strategies,
q∗ =( q∗
a|E,q ∗
r|U), are as follows:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




3) ∈ q∗ if 6
35 <Y B < 3
7,
(1,1) ∈ q∗ if 6
35 ≤ YB,




5Y2,0) ∈ q∗ if 2
3 <Y B.
Player A’s SRE strategies, p∗, are as follows:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




r|U and RB ≤ YA},
1 −
RB
YA ∈ p∗ if 2
7 <q ∗
r|U and RB <Y A,















a|E +3 ( 1− q00
r|U)). B’s kindness is κB =0if she subsequently chooses a,
and κB = −5 if she chooses r. Therefore, the diﬀerence between B’s utility








r|U − 3) following E,








r|U − 3) following U.
B’s best response is, following E,t oc h o o s ea with probability qa|E =0
if ∆UB < 0;a n yqa|E ∈ [0,1] if ∆UB =0 ;a n dqa|E =1if ∆UB > 0;a n d ,
following U,t oc h o o s er with probability qr|U =0if ∆UB > 0;a n yqr|U ∈ [0,1]
if ∆UB =0 ;a n dqr|U =1if ∆UB < 0.B ’ sS R E b e h a v i o r ,q∗ =( q∗
a|E,q∗
r|U),











r|U − 3) following U.
Am o m e n t ’ sr e ﬂection on the best response shows that q∗
r|U > 0 implies
q∗
a|E =1 ,a n dt h a tq∗
a|E < 1 implies q∗
r|U =0 . Hence, in any SRE, q∗
a|E =1
or q∗
r|U =0 .N o w , q∗ =( 1 ,q∗
r|U) is a best response, following E,f o ra n y
q∗
r|U;a n df o l l o w i n gU, if and only if 3 − 7
2YB(2 + 3q∗
r|U) has the appropriate
39sign. This condition gives B’s SRE behavior where q∗ =( 1 ,q ∗
r|U).F u r t h e r ,
q∗ =( q∗
a|E,0) with q∗
a|E < 1 is a best response, following E, if and only if
5+5
2YB(5q∗
a|E−3) ≤ 0;a n df o l l o w i n gU, if and only if 3− 7
2YB(5q∗
a|E−3) ≥ 0.
The former condition (which implies the latter) gives B’s SRE behavior (if
any) where q∗ =( q∗
a|E,0). Now consider player A. If she chooses C,h e r
kindness is κA = 1
2(5q0
a|E +3q0




Recall λA = −5p00(1−q0
a|E)−7(1−p00)q0
r|U ≤ 0. Hence the diﬀerence between
















A’s best response is determined, in the usual way, by the sign of ∆UA.I m p o s -
ing equilibrium beliefs and solving for A’s best response gives A’s SRE strate-
gies, p∗. Clearly, p∗ =0when q∗
r|U =0 .W h e nq∗
r|U > 0,t h e nq∗
a|E =1and A’s




Speciﬁcally, 0 ∈ p∗ if and only if ∆UA(0) ≤ 0; 1 ∈ p∗ if and only if
∆UA(1) ≥ 0; and mixed-strategy SRE behavior solves ∆UA(p∗)=0 .
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Supplementary material
A. Experimental protocol and instructions
The experimental protocol and the instructions for the SPD and the MUG
were identical, apart from the payoﬀs.
Registration. Participants had to register for the experiment. At the time
of announcement (in class), a sheet was circulated where participants could
register for room A or for room B.1 Registrations by e-mail were also in-
vited; these were assigned to room A or room B, to equalize the number of
participants in both rooms.2
Timing. The experiment consisted of two parts: part A in room A, where
subjects assumed the role of player A; and part B in room B, where subjects
assumed the role of player B. Part B started 90 minutes later than part A,
giving the experimenters time to prepare disclosure of A’s choice to the
corresponding B. Each part was scheduled during the last half hour of a
class (for a course that was taught twice, in diﬀerent rooms), with room
B subjects attending class at the time part A ended (so the A’s could not
communicate with the B’s).
Protocol. The rooms were large classrooms and subjects were seated at
ﬁxed-spaced intervals. The subjects received a folder containing ﬁve pages of
1N oi n f o r m a t i o na b o u tt h ee x p e r i m e n tw a sg i v e na tt h a tt i m e( e x c e p tt h a ti tc o n c e r n e d
an experiment on decision making, in which they could earn some money), thus ruling out
self-selection into a particular role.
2Due to a slightly unequal number of no-shows in the two rooms, in the SPD experiment
a few B’s could not be paired with an A and, as a result, could not eﬀectively participate;
these B’s received the average earnings of the B’s. In the MUG experiment, the reverse
happened: a few A’s could not be paired with a B (without possibly aﬀecting behavior or
beliefs of the A’s); those A’s received the average earnings of the A’s who had made the
same choice.
S1written instructions. The folders were labeled with a unique code, “Axxxx”
in room A and “Byyyy” in room B, where xxxx and yyyy were four-digit
numbers. The xxxx’s and the yyyy’s were disjoint sets. The folders also
contained a copy of this code, which was to be kept by the subject. In
room A, the A folders were distributed, the instructions were read aloud by
one of the experimenters, and the subjects wrote down their answers to the
questionnaire and their strategic choice. Part A ended on collecting the A
folders. Subsequently, page 5 (containing A’s strategic choice) was removed
from the A folders and inserted as page 5 in the corresponding B folder,
according to a list of randomly generated pairs (xxxx,yyyy). On inserting
this page in the B folder, it was stapled together with page 4, which was
opaque, so as to prevent the B’s from being informed about A’s choice right
away. The subjects in room B were allowed to remove the staples only
after they had given their answers to the questionnaire. Apart from this,
the procedure in room B was the same as in room A. The subjects were
paid the week after the experiment, upon presentation of their identiﬁcation
code.
Instructions. To ensure common knowledge, the instructions in room A and
room B were identical, except for the page headers (either “Instructions
f o rr o o mA ”o r“ I n s t r u c t i o n sf o rr o o mB ” )a n dt h eﬁrst two sentences on
page S 4 (either “You are in room A. Another group of students is in room
B.” or “You are in room B. Another group of students is in room A.”).
The instructions for the A’s in the SPD (translated from Dutch) were as
follows. (We added a few clarifying footnotes here, which were not part of
the instructions.)
S2General guidelines
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. Your participation is im-
portant to us and we are grateful to you for taking part. We ask that you
take the experiment seriously and follow the guidelines carefully.
We will ask each of you (individually) to make a decision and to answer a
number of questions. It is important that you do not communicate in
any way with anybody else in the room. If you do not honour this
request, we will have to ask you to leave the room.
The decision you make and the questions you answer can bring you some
money. What you earn during this experiment will be paid to you next
week in cash, anonymously and discreetly. The time and place of the
payment will be announced on the notice boards. Throughout the whole
experiment up until the time of payment, two fellow students, ...,3 will be
checking that we are observing the guidelines, respecting the anonymity of
the participants, and administering the payment in the correct way.
On the front of your folder are two identical anonymous identiﬁcation codes.
One of these is ﬁxed and the other is not. Remove the loose code discreetly
and put it in a secure place; this code is your only proof of identiﬁcation
and of your participation in this experiment. You will need this code when
you come for payment.
3Their names were given here.
S3Guidelines for room A
You are in room A. Another group of students is in room B. In
both rooms, A and B, the following guidelines will be distributed.
The general guidelines given on the previous page will also be
distributed in both rooms.
Everybody in room A is randomly paired with one person from room B.
Therefore, you, too, are paired with somebody from the other room. You
will not get to know during or after the experiment which person from the
other room you’ve been paired with.
Both you and the person from the other room with whom you are paired
will each make a decision. The order of the decision making is as follows:
1. First the person from room A decides. He/she chooses be-
t w e e no p t i o nA 1a n do p t i o nA 2 .
2. The decision of the person from room A (that is, his/her
choice of option A1 or option A2) is then communicated to
the person from room B with whom he/she is paired.
3. The person from room B then decides. He/she chooses be-
t w e e no p t i o nB 1a n do p t i o nB 2 .
Each person is free to choose any of the options oﬀered to him/her. The
amounts of money to be given to you and the person from the other room
with whom you’re paired will depend not only on your decision but also on
the decision of the person from the other room who is paired with you.
The following table shows how much each person will receive. Here, “A” is
t h ep e r s o nf r o mr o o mAa n d“ B ”i st h ep a i r e dp e r s o nf r o mr o o mB . 4
B then chooses B1 B then chooses B2
Ac h o o s e sA 1
A receives 6 euros
B receives 6 euros
A receives 0 euros
B receives 8 euros
Ac h o o s e sA 2
A receives 8 euros
B receives 0 euros
A receives 2 euros
B receives 2 euros
Note: the sums of money to be given to you and the person from the other
room with whom you are paired will not depend on the decisions of the
other people in room A and room B.
4At this point, the table was slowly read aloud while at the same time being projected
on a large screen, with the relevant part(s) being highlighted in red as reading progressed.
The table was read as four identically structured sentences: “If A chooses A1 [pause]a n d
thereafter B chooses B1 [pause] then A receives 6 euros and B receives 6 euros [pause].
If A chooses A1 [pause] and thereafter” and so on. At any [pause] the reader paused
a few seconds and the relevant cell of the table was highlighted progressively within the
sentence. At the end of each sentence, after pausing a few more seconds, the highlights
were switched oﬀ and the next sentence (if any) started.
S4Guidelines for room A
Each person in rooms A and B will also be asked to estimate certain per-
centages. These estimates are to be made before the decision is taken, and
for each person in room B before he/she learns what the decision is of the
person from room A with whom he/she is paired.
For every estimate you make that deviates no more than 5% from the actual
percentage, you will receive a bonus of 3 euros. This bonus is independent of
the amount you will receive as a consequence of your decision (your choice
between option A1/A2 or option B1/B2) and that of the person from the
other room with whom you are paired.
Your answers to these questions will not be communicated to the person
from the other room with whom you are paired.
T h ep e o p l ei nr o o mAa r ea s k e dt oe s t i m a t et h ef o l l o w i n gp e r -
centages: (To be answered by the people in room A after all the
guidelines have been given.)
a1. What percentage of people in room B who learned that the person from
room A with whom he/she is paired chose option A1 will subsequently
choose option B1? %
a2. What percentage of people in room B who learned that the person from
room A with whom he/she is paired chose option A2 will subsequently
choose option B2? %
a3. What is the average answer of the people from room B to question b1
below? %
The people in room B are asked to estimate the following per-
centages: (To be answered by the people in room B after all the
guidelines have been given.)
b1. What percentage of people in room A will choose option A1?
%
b2. What is the average answer of the people in room A to question a1
above? %
b3. What is the average answer of the people in room A to question a2
above? %
S5Guidelines for room A
T h es c h e d u l ef o rt h ee x p e r i m e n ti sa sf o l l o w s :
1. The guidelines for this experiment are given in room A.
2. The people in room A will get eight minutes to answer questions a1,
a2 and a3.
3. The people in room A will get two minutes to make a choice between
option A1 and option A2.
4. The folders in room A will then be collected. This completes the
participation of the people in room A.
5. The guidelines for this experiment are given in room B.
6. The people in room B will get eight minutes to answer questions b1,
b2 and b3.
7. The decision of each person from room A (that is, his/her choice of
option A1 or option A2) is communicated to the person from room B
with whom he/she is paired.
8. The people in room B will each get two minutes to make a choice
b e t w e e no p t i o nB 1a n do p t i o nB 2 .
9. The folders in room B will then be collected. This completes the
participation of the people in room B.
10. When you come for payment next week, you will personally receive a
summary of the following:
• Your decision and that of the person from the other room with
whom you were paired (that is, regarding the choices made be-
tween options A1/A2 and B1/B2);
• Your estimated percentages in answer to the questions (whether
a1, a2, a3; or b1, b2, b3) and the actual percentages;
• A calculation of the total amount that you have earned.
You will receive this summary and the payment in a closed envelope
w h e ny o uh a n di ny o u ri d e n t i ﬁcation code.
Remarks:
• You may re-read all the guidelines whenever you wish.
• You may not change your answers to the questions (a1, a2,
a3, or b1, b2, b3) anymore once the allotted time has expired.
This completes the guidelines for the experiment. We repeat once more that
these guidelines are being distributed in both rooms, A and B. We will now
go on to carry out that part of the experiment that is to take place in this
room.
S6Section A (to be ﬁl l e di nb yt h ep e r s o nf r o mr o o mA )
I choose option (only one option may be indicated):
0A 1
0A 2
Section B (to be ﬁlled in by the person from room B)
I choose option (only one option to be indicated):
0B 1
0B 2
S7B. Behavior, beliefs, and best responses in the SPD
Table 1: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player A in the SPD
A’s A’s beliefs A’s best response
behavior q0
c|C q0
d|D p00 material reciprocity
C 0.05 0.05 0.20 DC
C 0.05 0.95 0.75 DD
C 0.10 0.15 0.75 DD
C 0.10 0.65 0.60 DD
C 0.10 1.00 0.25 DD
C 0.13 0.95 0.74 DD
C 0.17 0.33 0.82 DD
C 0.18 0.95 0.88 DD
C 0.25 0.05 0.50 DC
C 0.25 0.95 0.50 DD
C 0.25 1.00 0.25 DD
C 0.30 1.00 0.10 DD
C 0.35 0.95 0.95 DD
C 0.40 0.75 0.70 DD
C 0.42 1.00 0.58 CD
C 0.43 0.95 0.59 CD
C 0.45 0.90 0.61 CD
C 0.50 0.90 0.40 CD
C 0.55 0.96 0.83 CD
C 0.60 0.95 0.40 CD
C 0.75 0.10 0.65 DC
C 0.75 0.95 0.70 CC
C 0.75 1.00 0.75 CC
C 0.80 0.40 0.80 DC
C 0.85 1.00 0.85 CC
C 0.94 0.20 0.50 DC
C 0.94 0.95 0.85 CC
D 0.00 0.90 0.50 DD
D 0.00 1.00 0.00 DD
D 0.00 1.00 0.00 DD
D 0.00 1.00 0.00 DD
D 0.00 1.00 0.05 DD
D 0.01 0.80 0.30 DD
S8Table 1: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player A in the SPD (contd.)
A’s A’s beliefs A’s best response
behavior q0
c|C q0
d|D p00 material reciprocity
D 0.01 1.00 0.02 DD
D 0.02 1.00 0.01 DD
D 0.04 0.96 0.10 DD
D 0.04 0.96 0.11 DD
D 0.04 0.98 0.30 DD
D 0.05 0.05 0.95 DD
D 0.05 0.95 0.45 DD
D 0.05 0.95 0.80 DD
D 0.05 0.99 0.76 DD
D 0.05 1.00 0.03 DD
D 0.05 1.00 0.05 DD
D 0.07 0.95 0.13 DD
D 0.08 0.94 0.43 DD
D 0.10 0.96 0.16 DD
D 0.15 0.95 0.13 DD
D 0.17 1.00 0.83 DD
D 0.18 0.95 0.05 DD
D 0.18 0.98 0.11 DD
D 0.19 0.95 0.24 DD
D 0.20 0.88 0.30 DD
D 0.20 0.90 0.15 DD
D 0.20 0.90 0.25 DD
D 0.20 0.95 0.50 DD
D 0.20 0.95 0.50 DD
D 0.20 1.00 0.30 DD
D 0.23 0.93 0.31 DD
D 0.31 0.23 0.35 DC
D 0.35 0.93 0.75 DD
D 0.37 0.86 0.24 DD
D 0.40 0.60 0.35 DD
D 0.82 0.95 0.10 CD
D 0.95 1.00 0.80 CC
D 0.95 1.00 0.85 CC
S9Table 2: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player B in the SPD
A’s B’s B’s beliefs B’s best response
behavior behavior p0 q00
c|C q00
d|D material reciprocity
Cc 0.10 0.05 1.00 dc
Cc 0.20 0.50 1.00 dc
Cc 0.20 0.85 1.00 dc
Cc 0.21 0.42 0.84 dc
Cc 0.27 0.18 0.82 dc
Cc 0.37 0.40 0.86 dc
Cc 0.65 0.75 1.00 dc
Cc 0.70 0.10 0.95 dc
Cc 0.78 0.63 0.42 dc
Cc 0.87 0.95 0.95 dc
Cd 0.04 0.04 0.96 dc
Cd 0.05 0.03 0.95 dc
Cd 0.05 0.05 0.95 dc
Cd 0.09 0.33 0.99 dc
Cd 0.11 0.00 1.00 dc
Cd 0.12 0.14 0.96 dc
Cd 0.12 0.24 0.93 dc
Cd 0.15 0.05 0.95 dc
Cd 0.15 0.05 0.95 dc
Cd 0.15 0.20 0.95 dc
Cd 0.20 0.05 0.90 dc
Cd 0.25 0.10 0.90 dc
Cd 0.28 0.09 0.90 dc
Cd 0.43 0.38 0.95 dc
Cd 0.62 0.72 0.87 dc
Cd 0.68 0.24 0.37 dc
Cd 0.88 0.78 0.62 dc
Dd 0.04 0.91 0.95 dd
Dd 0.05 0.01 0.99 dd
Dd 0.05 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.05 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.05 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.05 0.05 0.95 dd
S1 0Table 2: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player B in the SPD (contd.)
A’s B’s B’s beliefs B’s best response
behavior behavior p0 q00
c|C q00
d|D material reciprocity
Dd 0.05 0.15 0.95 dd
Dd 0.09 0.31 0.95 dd
Dd 0.10 0.95 0.95 dd
Dd 0.12 0.15 0.96 dd
Dd 0.14 0.09 0.92 dd
Dd 0.15 0.04 0.98 dd
Dd 0.15 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.16 0.06 0.95 dd
Dd 0.17 0.04 0.96 dd
Dd 0.20 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.20 0.50 0.95 dd
Dd 0.25 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.25 0.10 1.00 dd
Dd 0.25 0.25 0.96 dd
Dd 0.25 0.65 1.00 dd
Dd 0.35 0.30 0.95 dd
Dd 0.35 0.45 0.95 dd
Dd 0.39 0.09 0.07 dd
Dd 0.40 0.65 0.70 dd
Dd 0.48 0.29 0.78 dd
Dd 0.50 0.30 0.95 dd
Dd 0.60 0.05 0.95 dd
Dd 0.62 0.70 0.96 dd
Dd 0.68 0.72 0.23 dd
Dd 0.70 0.50 0.85 dd
Dd 0.70 0.55 0.95 dd
Dd 0.70 0.60 1.00 dd
Dd 0.80 0.00 0.00 dd
Dd 0.83 0.37 0.58 dd
Dd 0.85 0.20 0.95 dd
Dd 0.86 0.80 0.95 dd
Dd 0.91 0.02 0.98 dd
Dd 0.95 0.05 0.95 dd
S1 1C. Behavior, beliefs, and best responses in the MUG
Table 3: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player A in the MUG
A’s A’s beliefs A’s best response
behavior q0
a|E q0
r|U p00 material reciprocity
E 0.76 0.34 0.56 UU
E 0.78 0.17 0.72 UU
E 0.84 0.62 0.56 EU
E 0.85 0.60 0.70 EU
E 0.85 0.65 0.70 EU
E 0.85 0.75 0.70 EU
E 0.87 0.23 0.65 UU
E 0.89 0.63 0.75 EU
E 0.90 0.20 0.95 UU
E 0.90 0.40 0.60 EU
E 0.90 0.70 0.40 EU
E 0.90 0.70 0.85 EU
E 0.94 0.06 0.61 UU
E 0.95 0.05 0.20 UU
E 0.95 0.05 0.40 UU
E 0.95 0.05 0.50 UU
E 0.95 0.05 0.65 UU
E 0.95 0.05 0.75 UU
E 0.95 0.07 0.43 UU
E 0.95 0.08 0.83 UU
E 0.95 0.12 0.18 UU
E 0.95 0.23 0.42 UU
E 0.95 0.23 0.71 UU
E 0.95 0.40 0.60 EU
E 0.95 0.55 0.85 EU
E 0.95 0.75 0.70 EU
E 0.95 0.83 0.65 EU
E 0.95 0.90 0.60 EU
E 0.95 0.95 0.75 EU
E 0.96 0.20 0.45 UU
S1 2Table 3: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player A in the MUG
(contd.)
A’s A’s beliefs A’s best response
behavior q0
a|E q0
r|U p00 material reciprocity
E 0.96 0.20 0.75 UU
E 0.96 0.25 0.80 UU
E 0.98 0.05 0.64 UU
E 0.98 0.80 0.45 EU
E 0.98 0.83 0.88 EU
E 0.98 0.90 0.65 EU
E 1.00 0.00 0.75 UE , U
E 1.00 0.60 0.65 EU
E 1.00 0.75 0.50 EU
E 1.00 0.80 0.60 EU
U 0.25 0.25 0.50 UE
U 0.25 0.75 0.34 UU
U 0.90 0.00 0.45 UU
U 0.91 0.23 0.37 UU
U 0.95 0.04 0.05 UU
U 0.95 0.04 0.23 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.05 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.05 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.05 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.10 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.35 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.38 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.40 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.64 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.80 UU
U 0.95 0.06 0.70 UU
U 0.95 0.10 0.70 UU
U 0.95 0.19 0.51 UU
U 0.95 0.70 0.20 EU
S1 3Table 3: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player A in the MUG
(contd.)
A’s A’s beliefs A’s best response
behavior q0
a|E q0
r|U p00 material reciprocity
U 0.95 0.75 0.45 EU
U 0.95 0.90 0.60 EU
U 0.95 0.92 0.83 EU
U 0.95 0.93 0.05 EU
U 0.95 0.95 0.05 EU
U 0.96 0.02 0.86 UU
U 0.96 0.04 0.28 UU
U 0.96 0.05 0.07 UU
U 0.97 0.32 0.55 EU
U 0.98 0.97 0.87 EU
U 0.99 0.01 0.10 UU
U 0.99 0.02 0.15 UU
U 1.00 0.00 0.03 UE , U
U 1.00 0.00 0.05 UE , U
U 1.00 0.00 0.06 UE , U
U 1.00 0.00 0.30 UE , U
U 1.00 0.00 1.00 UE , U
U 1.00 0.05 0.05 UU
U 1.00 0.09 0.65 UU
U 1.00 0.96 0.30 EU
U 1.00 1.00 0.05 EU
U 0.95 0.05 0.10 UU
U 0.95 0.95 0.05 EU
U 0.96 0.13 0.44 UU
U 0.97 0.03 0.20 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.12 UU
U 0.95 0.05 0.33 UU
U 0.95 0.84 0.20 EU
U 0.95 0.25 0.40 UU
S1 4Table 4: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player B in the MUG
A’s B’s B’s beliefs B’s best response
behavior behavior p0 q00
a|E q00
r|U material reciprocity
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.10 aa
Ea 0.22 1.00 0.97 aa
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.20 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.65 0.90 0.60 aa
Ea 0.04 1.00 0.95 aa
Ea 0.28 0.95 0.11 aa
Ea 0.40 0.90 0.25 aa
Ea 0.07 0.05 0.09 ar
Ea 0.25 1.00 0.23 aa
Ea 0.37 0.98 0.02 aa
Ea 0.65 0.95 0.18 aa
Ea 0.06 0.96 0.05 aa
Ea 0.08 0.98 0.03 aa
Ea 0.75 0.95 0.30 aa
Ea 0.95 0.90 0.00 aa
Ea 0.05 0.97 0.00 aa
Ea 0.05 0.98 0.00 aa
Ea 0.05 0.96 0.05 aa
Ea 0.16 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.70 0.95 0.15 aa
Ea 0.94 0.98 0.74 aa
Ea 0.73 0.95 0.15 aa
Ea 0.07 0.97 0.10 aa
Ea 0.06 0.96 0.86 aa
S1 5Table 4: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player B in the MUG
(contd.)
A’s B’s B’s beliefs B’s best response
behavior behavior p0 q00
a|E q00
r|U material reciprocity
Ea 0.20 0.95 0.05 aa
Ea 0.35 0.95 0.33 aa
Ea 0.20 0.90 0.82 aa
Ea 0.70 0.99 0.01 aa
Ea 0.02 0.99 0.01 aa
Ea 0.15 0.94 0.05 aa
Ea 0.05 0.98 0.30 aa
Ea 0.38 1.00 0.00 aa
Ea 0.55 1.00 0.30 aa
Ea 0.00 1.00 0.15 aa
Ea 0.05 0.95 0.10 aa
Ea 0.95 1.00 0.00 aa
Ua 0.26 0.96 0.04 ar
Ua 0.67 0.94 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.93 0.10 ar
Ua 0.15 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 1.00 0.00 ar
Ua 0.20 0.90 0.10 ar
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.63 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.40 0.95 0.04 ar
Ua 0.02 0.99 0.03 ar
Ua 0.95 0.95 0.95 ar
Ua 0.40 1.00 0.00 ar
Ua 0.65 0.85 0.20 ar
Ua 1.00 1.00 0.00 ar
S1 6Table 4: Behavior, beliefs, and best responses of player B in the MUG
(contd.)
A’s B’s B’s beliefs B’s best response
behavior behavior p0 q00
a|E q00
r|U material reciprocity
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.95 ar
Ua 0.83 1.00 0.17 ar
Ua 0.02 0.98 0.02 ar
Ua 0.33 0.95 0.10 ar
Ua 0.75 0.90 0.55 ar
Ua 0.10 0.96 0.04 ar
Ua 0.01 1.00 0.01 ar
Ua 0.15 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.12 0.95 0.10 ar
Ua 0.72 0.95 0.65 ar
Ua 0.15 0.90 0.10 ar
Ua 0.00 1.00 0.00 ar
Ua 0.78 0.95 0.32 ar
Ua 0.85 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.88 0.96 0.04 ar
Ua 0.06 0.95 0.07 ar
Ua 0.05 0.95 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.96 0.05 ar
Ua 0.05 0.90 0.10 ar
Ua 0.75 0.99 0.02 ar
Ua 0.72 0.96 0.03 ar
Ua 0.46 0.95 0.23 ar
Ua 0.60 0.95 0.35 ar
Ur 0.60 0.95 0.10 ar
Ur 0.20 0.95 0.30 ar
Ur 0.58 0.94 0.67 ar
Ur 0.82 0.95 0.20 ar
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